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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(Wednesday, 30 September 1959 at 10:20 a.m.)



1. I indicated to the President that my first item was the so-called "White Paper." I reminded him of our various discussions on the subject and told him that General Goodpaster had informed me about the comment General Twining had made to the President on September 28. I said that I felt that General Twining had in a sense "jumped the gun" because at the Planning Board meeting on 25 September a consensus had developed that no recommendation should be made to issue a public policy statement based on basic national security policy. In response to a question, I explained to the President that the Planning Board interest had been only to excise from the basic policy those portions necessary to make it possible to have a publishable document and that the Planning Board did not contemplate that any document would be issued as a National Security Council paper. The President said that his feeling was that we should in no way put out any document which purported to be or could be inferred to be a National Security Council paper. He therefore wished it understood that the Secretary of State could make any policy statements he wished which of course should be in accord with national security policy but not so identified. I indicated to the President that I would communicate this information to the Secretary of State, and as far as I was concerned I would do no further work on the project and would consider the matter closed as far as the Planning Board was concerned.
2. I then discussed with the President the matter of bringing the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities dated June 30, 1953, up-to-date. I said that General Goodpaster had reported to me the President's decision that there should be a new committee to study the whole report and its findings, conclusions, and recommendations in the light of changes in the world situation which have occurred or can be anticipated, less organization matters, as dealt with in Chapter 7 of the Report. Also, I understood that the President agreed with my original recommendation that the membership of such a committee be drawn entirely from people now in government. The President indicated his agreement. I asked him, however, if he would not reconsider

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this decision because after further thought I felt the interest of objectivity could be served by having some outside membership. I recalled that as a member of the earlier committee I had felt that the non-government members succeeded in making certain that the committee did not simply end up endorsing existing practices, etc. I said to the President that indeed it seemed to me that even the chairman could be non-governmental and I thought of someone like Sigurd Larmon. After some further discussion he said he would approve of adding to any such committee the names of Sigurd Larmon and C. D. Jackson, adding that he felt that if Mr. Jackson were better informed of what was going on he would be exerting less pressure on the President.

I then asked the President if he wished me to discuss this in the National Security Council and he felt that this should not be done at the present time.

3. I pointed out to the President that there were current problems which the committee should address itself to seriously, such as problems with respect to Radio Free Europe that the Vice President and Dr. Milton Eisenhower had encountered when they visited Warsaw.

At this point the President interrupted to say that he wished me to get immediately in touch with Secretary of State Herter and the Director of USIA, George Allen. He said that in the recent Camp David talks Mr. Khrushchev had indicated that the Soviet Union ~~did not~~ jam what he referred to as legitimate broadcasts such as speeches of government officials. Mr. Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would jam broadcasts which were calculated to defy the Soviet government or to reach over the head of the Soviet government to the Soviet people. The President felt that he wished the U.S. now to show some initiative in bringing the Voice of America in line with this kind of prescription. 66

4. I then indicated to the President that I had been giving some thought to possible usefulness of the Council and its machinery with respect to issues which may have arisen out of his talks with Mr. Khrushchev. I said that it seemed to me that the only one which at the moment was pertinent was the issue of Berlin and German unification. I reminded him of paragraph 44 of NSC 5803, together with NSC Action 1858.

I said to the President that at least some new ideas might come out of Planning Board discussions and that should this prove to be the case we could prepare a discussion paper which I would clear with him before taking it to the Council.

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The President then said that I should discuss this with Secretary Herter and should indicate to him that there were possibly some alternatives. Under present circumstances and as a result of the talks with Mr. Khrushchev we were no longer in a situation with respect to the Russians in which they were saying "take our solution or war." He said [we must remember that Berlin is an abnormal situation; that we had found it necessary to live with it; and that it had come about through some mistakes of our leaders -- Churchill and Roosevelt. However, he felt that there must be some way to develop some kind of a free city which might be somehow a part of West Germany, which might require that the U.N. would become a party to guaranteeing the freedom, safety, and security of the city which would have an unarmed status except for police forces. He reiterated that the time was coming and perhaps soon when we would simply have to get our forces out.] In any event, he thought well of seeking alternatives and authorized me to proceed.

5. I then said to the President that I wanted to mention one agenda item which would be considered in the NSC on Thursday, October 1 in his absence. This had to do with a new definition of the Mobilization Base which would become a paragraph in the Basic National Security Policy. I reminded the President that in 1957 we had gone from a concept of M/36 months to one of M/6 months. The new paragraph now would reduce the period still further and eliminate a reference to M/6 months entirely. Thus, we have made substantial steps towards approaching more realistic planning and the emphasis now and henceforth will be on readiness. The President said he agreed that the emphasis should be on readiness. However, he felt that in addition to military readiness, we should think of civilian readiness that would be necessary to begin to rebuild this country if it suffers an atomic attack. He visualized, for example, that we would probably have to have dispersed stocks of all kinds all around the country. He thought of, in addition to food and medicines, other items for survival and for the beginning of recovery. For example, we might consider what would be required to have on hand to enable the small factories and indeed large ones for that matter if they weren't entirely destroyed, to begin production again.

I told the President that this view was not unanimously shared by his advisors and I suspected that before the Mobilization paragraph were finally adopted, he would be involved in some of the discussions.

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In this connection I informed the President that I had authorized the examination of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies by the group of staff officers who were making the study he had requested of what our situation would be after an attack on this country.



Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lay